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Every technique
T1688Detection written

Safe Mode Boot

Defense ImpairmentWindows

Where this stands

A Sigma rule exists for this technique in the corpus.

A detection for this technique exists in the corpus. Log in to read it.

When a detection for this fires

Defence evasionSomething tried to hide, disable logging, or look like software it is not. Treat other alerts as unreliable from this point.

What the technique is

Adversaries may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services. Third-party security software such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools may not start after booting Windows in safe mode. There are two versions of safe mode: Safe Mode and Safe Mode with Networking. It is possible to start additional services after a safe mode boot. Adversaries may abuse safe mode to disable endpoint defenses that may not start with a limited boot. Hosts can be forced into safe mode after the next reboot via modifications to Boot Configuration Data (BCD) stores, which are files that manage boot application settings. Adversaries may also add their malicious applications to the list of minimal services that start in safe mode by modifying relevant Registry values (i.e. Modify Registry). Malicious Component Object Model (COM) objects may also be registered and loaded in safe mode.

Read it on attack.mitre.org

What MITRE says you would watch

  • AN0323

    Abuse of safe mode via BCD modification, boot configuration utilities (bcdedit.exe, bootcfg.exe), and registry persistence under SafeBoot keys. Defender view: suspicious boot configuration changes correlated with registry edits that enable adversary persistence or disable defenses.

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