Skip to content
Every technique
T1688Detection written

Safe Mode Boot

Defense ImpairmentWindows

Where this stands

One published detection covers this technique. Every one is unverified — no rule on Siemphony has been executed against real telemetry.

What the technique is

Adversaries may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services. Third-party security software such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools may not start after booting Windows in safe mode. There are two versions of safe mode: Safe Mode and Safe Mode with Networking. It is possible to start additional services after a safe mode boot. Adversaries may abuse safe mode to disable endpoint defenses that may not start with a limited boot. Hosts can be forced into safe mode after the next reboot via modifications to Boot Configuration Data (BCD) stores, which are files that manage boot application settings. Adversaries may also add their malicious applications to the list of minimal services that start in safe mode by modifying relevant Registry values (i.e. Modify Registry). Malicious Component Object Model (COM) objects may also be registered and loaded in safe mode.

Read it on attack.mitre.org

What MITRE says you would watch

  • AN0323

    Abuse of safe mode via BCD modification, boot configuration utilities (bcdedit.exe, bootcfg.exe), and registry persistence under SafeBoot keys. Defender view: suspicious boot configuration changes correlated with registry edits that enable adversary persistence or disable defenses.

Technique names and descriptions © MITRE ATT&CK®, CC BY 4.0. Not endorsed by MITRE.