XDG Autostart Entries
Where this stands
One published detection covers this technique. Every one is unverified — no rule on Siemphony has been executed against real telemetry.
What the technique is
Adversaries may add or modify XDG Autostart Entries to execute malicious programs or commands when a user’s desktop environment is loaded at login. XDG Autostart entries are available for any XDG-compliant Linux system. XDG Autostart entries use Desktop Entry files (.desktop) to configure the user’s desktop environment upon user login. These configuration files determine what applications launch upon user login, define associated applications to open specific file types, and define applications used to open removable media. Adversaries may abuse this feature to establish persistence by adding a path to a malicious binary or command to the Exec directive in the.desktop configuration file. When the user’s desktop environment is loaded at user login, the.desktop files located in the XDG Autostart directories are automatically executed. System-wide Autostart entries are located in the /etc/xdg/autostart directory while the user entries are located in the ~/.config/autostart directory. Adversaries may combine this technique with Masquerading to blend malicious Autostart entries with legitimate programs.
Read it on attack.mitre.orgWhat MITRE says you would watch
- AN1096
Correlation of file creation/modification of.desktop files within XDG autostart directories, followed by execution of processes at user login initiated by the desktop environment. Malicious entries typically include suspicious Exec paths or anomalous names and are not associated with installed packages.
Technique names and descriptions © MITRE ATT&CK®, CC BY 4.0. Not endorsed by MITRE.