T1422Not expressible in SigmaMOBILE

System Network Configuration Discovery

DiscoveryAndroid, iOS

Where this stands

No Sigma rule can address this — the telemetry MITRE names has no Sigma logsource behind it.

Sigma has no logsource taxonomy for mobile platforms. MITRE's telemetry here is mobile EDR and device APIs, which no Sigma rule can address.

What the technique is

Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of devices they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Adversaries may use the information from System Network Configuration Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next. On Android, details of onboard network interfaces are accessible to apps through the java.net.NetworkInterface class. Previously, the Android TelephonyManager class could be used to gather telephony-related device identifiers, information such as the IMSI, IMEI, and phone number. However, starting with Android 10, only preloaded, carrier, the default SMS, or device and profile owner applications can access the telephony-related device identifiers. On iOS, gathering network configuration information is not possible without root access. Adversaries may use the information from System Network Configuration Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next.

Read it on attack.mitre.org

What MITRE says you would watch

AN1706
Defender observes an app (package/UID) repeatedly retrieving network interface configuration attributes (local IP/MAC/interface names, active network capabilities, link properties, proxy/DNS settings, or carrier identifiers when permitted) in a short time window, without corresponding user network-management activity. The pattern is characterized by OS API execution for interface/config reads combined with background state, permission/role context (e.g., device owner/profile owner/carrier/default-SMS), and optional follow-on connectivity tests (gateway/DNS/proxy reachability). […]
AN1707
Application vetting services could look for usage of the READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE Android permission. This could indicate that non-system apps are attempting to access information that they do not have access to.