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Every technique
T1213.006Detection written

Databases

CollectionIaaS, Linux, macOS, SaaS, Windows

Where this stands

One published detection covers this technique. Every one is unverified — no rule on Siemphony has been executed against real telemetry.

What the technique is

Adversaries may leverage databases to mine valuable information. These databases may be hosted on-premises or in the cloud (both in platform-as-a-service and software-as-a-service environments). Examples of databases from which information may be collected include MySQL, PostgreSQL, MongoDB, Amazon Relational Database Service, Azure SQL Database, Google Firebase, and Snowflake. Databases may include a variety of information of interest to adversaries, such as usernames, hashed passwords, personally identifiable information, and financial data. Data collected from databases may be used for Lateral Movement, Command and Control, or Exfiltration. Data exfiltrated from databases may also be used to extort victims or may be sold for profit.

Read it on attack.mitre.org

What MITRE says you would watch

  • AN0676

    Unusual database command-line access (e.g., psql, mysql, mongo) from non-admin users, occurring outside typical automation windows or without known service context. Often followed by data dumps to.sql/.csv files or outbound data transfers. Defender sees CLI tools launched interactively or by unusual parent processes, file writes to dump-like filenames, and external connections shortly after.

  • AN0677

    Database client execution (e.g., sqlcmd.exe, isql.exe) by users or from locations not tied to enterprise automation or backups. Often followed by creation of.sql/.bak/.csv files, registry artifacts for ODBC/JDBC drivers, or encrypted ZIPs. Defender sees SQL tools launched by explorer.exe, Powershell, or odd parent processes, plus file writes in user temp locations.

  • AN0678

    Execution of Java-based or CLI database tools (e.g., DBeaver, Beekeeper, mysql, psql) from user profiles not tied to dev/admin roles, especially when followed by file writes and cloud sync activity. Defender correlates GUI tool launches, file write events in ~/Downloads or ~/Documents, and outbound API calls to known cloud services.

Technique names and descriptions © MITRE ATT&CK®, CC BY 4.0. Not endorsed by MITRE.