Additional Container Cluster Roles
Where this stands
No Sigma rule can address this — the telemetry MITRE names has no Sigma logsource behind it.
None of MITRE's analytics for this technique name a log source that maps to a Sigma logsource — they describe abstract data ("Process::None"), API-hook telemetry, or prose channels with no reliable field names behind them.
What the technique is
An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled user or service account to maintain persistent access to a container orchestration system. For example, an adversary with sufficient permissions may create a RoleBinding or a ClusterRoleBinding to bind a Role or ClusterRole to a Kubernetes account. Where attribute-based access control (ABAC) is in use, an adversary with sufficient permissions may modify a Kubernetes ABAC policy to give the target account additional permissions. This account modification may immediately follow Create Account or other malicious account activity. Adversaries may also modify existing Valid Accounts that they have compromised. Note that where container orchestration systems are deployed in cloud environments, as with Google Kubernetes Engine, Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service, and Azure Kubernetes Service, cloud-based role-based access control (RBAC) assignments or ABAC policies can often be used in place of or in addition to local permission assignments. In these cases, this technique may be used in conjunction with Additional Cloud Roles.
Read it on attack.mitre.orgWhat MITRE says you would watch
- AN1579
Detects assignment of high-privilege roles to user or service accounts via Kubernetes RoleBinding or ClusterRoleBinding objects, especially outside of CI/CD automation or from unknown IPs.
Technique names and descriptions © MITRE ATT&CK®, CC BY 4.0. Not endorsed by MITRE.