T1078.004Not expressible in Sigma

Cloud Accounts

Stealth · Persistence · Privilege Escalation · Initial AccessIaaS, Identity Provider, Office Suite, SaaS

Where this stands

No Sigma rule can address this — the telemetry MITRE names has no Sigma logsource behind it.

None of MITRE's analytics for this technique name a log source that maps to a Sigma logsource — they describe abstract data ("Process::None"), API-hook telemetry, or prose channels with no reliable field names behind them.

What the technique is

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory. Service or user accounts may be targeted by adversaries through Brute Force, Phishing, or various other means to gain access to the environment. Federated or synced accounts may be a pathway for the adversary to affect both on-premises systems and cloud environments - for example, by leveraging shared credentials to log onto Remote Services. High privileged cloud accounts, whether federated, synced, or cloud-only, may also allow pivoting to on-premises environments by leveraging SaaS-based Software Deployment Tools to run commands on hybrid-joined devices. An adversary may create long lasting Additional Cloud Credentials on a compromised cloud account to maintain persistence in the environment. Such credentials may also be used to bypass security controls such as multi-factor authentication. […]

Read it on attack.mitre.org

What MITRE says you would watch

AN1503
Detects anomalous authentication activity such as sign-ins from impossible geolocations or legacy protocols from high-privileged accounts.
AN1504
Detects cloud account use for API calls that exceed normal scope, such as IAM changes or access to services never used before.
AN1505
Detects unexpected access or usage of cloud productivity tools (e.g., downloading large numbers of files, creating external shares) by internal users.