T1055No distinct observable

Process Injection

Stealth · Privilege EscalationLinux, macOS, Windows

Where this stands

A reviewer read the telemetry and concluded there is nothing here to detect that a sibling technique does not already cover.

Parent technique whose every analytic is a child's mechanism, on log sources a child already occupies. AN1399's Windows chain (VirtualAllocEx + WriteProcessMemory + CreateRemoteThread observed as a GrantedAccess mask on Sysmon EventID 10) is byte-for-byte the chain already published in this corpus as T1055.001 on the identical logsource (category: process_access, product: windows) with the same mask list -- a parent rule there would be a duplicate that fires on the same events and adds no coverage; T1055.002 already occupies the second variant of the same handle on the same feed. AN1399's other two sources add nothing at parent level: Sysmon EventID 1 carries no injection observable at all, and 'unusual DLL loads within another process's context' on EventID 7 is a baseline comparison, not a single-event predicate expressible in lib/sigma. […]

Covered instead by T1055.001, T1055.002, T1055.003, T1055.008, T1055.009.

When a detection for this fires

Privilege escalationAn attempt to gain rights the account did not have, or to run inside a process that already had them.

What the technique is

Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. There are many different ways to inject code into a process, many of which abuse legitimate functionalities. These implementations exist for every major OS but are typically platform specific. More sophisticated samples may perform multiple process injections to segment modules and further evade detection, utilizing named pipes or other inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms as a communication channel.

Read it on attack.mitre.org

What MITRE says you would watch

AN1399
Detects process injection by correlating memory manipulation API calls (e.g., VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory), suspicious thread creation (e.g., CreateRemoteThread), and unusual DLL loads within another process's context.
AN1400
Detects ptrace- or memfd-based process injection through audit logs capturing system calls (e.g., ptrace, mmap) targeting running processes along with suspicious file descriptors or memory writes.
AN1401
Detects memory-based injection by monitoring task_for_pid, mach_vm_write, and dylib injection patterns through DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES or manual memory mapping.