Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol
Where this stands
One published detection covers this technique. Every one is unverified — no rule on Siemphony has been executed against real telemetry.
What the technique is
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. Adversaries may opt to obfuscate this data, without the use of encryption, within network protocols that are natively unencrypted (such as HTTP, FTP, or DNS). This may include custom or publicly available encoding/compression algorithms (such as base64) as well as embedding data within protocol headers and fields.
Read it on attack.mitre.orgWhat MITRE says you would watch
- AN0423
Detects data access or staging events followed by outbound data flows using unencrypted protocols (e.g., FTP, HTTP) initiated by unexpected processes or to rare destinations.
- AN0424
Detects file access or compression utilities followed by outbound connections using curl, wget, ftp, or custom binaries communicating over unencrypted protocols.
- AN0425
Detects abnormal outbound HTTP/FTP connections by local scripts or binaries outside of standard browser activity, following access to local documents or user data.
Technique names and descriptions © MITRE ATT&CK®, CC BY 4.0. Not endorsed by MITRE.