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Every technique
T1027.007No distinct observable

Dynamic API Resolution

StealthWindows

Where this stands

A reviewer read the telemetry and concluded there is nothing here to detect that a sibling technique does not already cover.

AN0250 is the only analytic in DET0091, and it names a 'behavioral chain involving suspicious use of GetProcAddress and LoadLibrary following memory allocation and manual mapping, often paired with low entropy strings, abnormal API use without static import tables, or delayed module load behaviors.' Every element of that chain is either an in-process API call Sysmon does not instrument, a correlation lib/sigma cannot express, or a static-analysis fact no field in either log source carries. Sysmon EventID 1 (process_creation) has Image, CommandLine, ParentImage and Hashes; it has no field for a call to GetProcAddress or LoadLibrary, because those are function calls made inside an already-running process, not a process launch, and never produce a process-creation record at all. […]

What the technique is

Adversaries may obfuscate then dynamically resolve API functions called by their malware in order to conceal malicious functionalities and impair defensive analysis. Malware commonly uses various Native API functions provided by the OS to perform various tasks such as those involving processes, files, and other system artifacts. API functions called by malware may leave static artifacts such as strings in payload files. Defensive analysts may also uncover which functions a binary file may execute via an import address table (IAT) or other structures that help dynamically link calling code to the shared modules that provide functions. To avoid static or other defensive analysis, adversaries may use dynamic API resolution to conceal malware characteristics and functionalities. Similar to Software Packing, dynamic API resolution may change file signatures and obfuscate malicious API function calls until they are resolved and invoked during runtime. Various methods may be used to obfuscate malware calls to API functions. For example, hashes of function names are commonly stored in malware in lieu of literal strings. Malware can use these hashes (or other identifiers) to manually reproduce the linking and loading process using functions such as GetProcAddress() and LoadLibrary(). […]

Read it on attack.mitre.org

What MITRE says you would watch

  • AN0250

    Behavioral chain involving suspicious use of GetProcAddress and LoadLibrary following memory allocation and manual mapping, often paired with low entropy strings, abnormal API use without static import tables, or delayed module load behaviors.

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