Distributed Component Object Model
Where this stands
One published detection covers this technique. Every one is unverified — no rule on Siemphony has been executed against real telemetry.
What the technique is
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote machines by taking advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. The Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE). Distributed COM (DCOM) is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of COM beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology. Permissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry. By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM. Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods. […]
Read it on attack.mitre.orgWhat MITRE says you would watch
- AN0791
A remote DCOM invocation by a privileged account using RPC (port 135), followed by abnormal process instantiation or module loading on the remote system indicative of code execution.
Technique names and descriptions © MITRE ATT&CK®, CC BY 4.0. Not endorsed by MITRE.