Cached Domain Credentials
Where this stands
One published detection covers this technique. Every one is unverified — no rule on Siemphony has been executed against real telemetry.
What the technique is
Adversaries may attempt to access cached domain credentials used to allow authentication to occur in the event a domain controller is unavailable. On Windows Vista and newer, the hash format is DCC2 (Domain Cached Credentials version 2) hash, also known as MS-Cache v2 hash. The number of default cached credentials varies and can be altered per system. This hash does not allow pass-the-hash style attacks, and instead requires Password Cracking to recover the plaintext password. On Linux systems, Active Directory credentials can be accessed through caches maintained by software like System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) or Quest Authentication Services (formerly VAS). Cached credential hashes are typically located at /var/lib/sss/db/cache.[domain].ldb for SSSD or /var/opt/quest/vas/authcache/vas_auth.vdb for Quest. Adversaries can use utilities, such as tdbdump, on these database files to dump the cached hashes and use Password Cracking to obtain the plaintext password. With SYSTEM or sudo access, the tools/utilities such as Mimikatz, Reg, and secretsdump.py for Windows or Linikatz for Linux can be used to extract the cached credentials. Note: Cached credentials for Windows Vista are derived using PBKDF2.
Read it on attack.mitre.orgWhat MITRE says you would watch
- AN1417
Detects adversary behavior accessing Windows cached domain credential files using tools like Mimikatz, reg.exe, or PowerShell, often combined with registry exports or LSASS memory scraping.
- AN1418
Detects access to SSSD or Quest VAS cached credential databases using tdbdump or other file access patterns, requiring sudo/root access.
Technique names and descriptions © MITRE ATT&CK®, CC BY 4.0. Not endorsed by MITRE.