LSASS Memory
Where this stands
One published detection covers this technique. Every one is unverified — no rule on Siemphony has been executed against real telemetry.
What the technique is
Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct Lateral Movement using Use Alternate Authentication Material. As well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system. For example, on the target host use procdump: procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump Locally, mimikatz can be run using: sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp sekurlsa::logonPasswords Built-in Windows tools such as comsvcs.dll can also be used: rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump PID lsass.dmp full Similar to Image File Execution Options Injection, the silent process exit mechanism can be abused to create a memory dump of lsass.exe through Windows Error Reporting (WerFault.exe). Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSASS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. […]
Read it on attack.mitre.orgWhat MITRE says you would watch
- AN1030
A non-privileged or abnormal process attempts to open a handle with full access (0x1F0FFF) to lsass.exe and subsequently invokes memory dump, file creation, or registry modification indicative of credential scraping. This behavior chain reflects staged credential theft activity.
Technique names and descriptions © MITRE ATT&CK®, CC BY 4.0. Not endorsed by MITRE.